On April 17, Princeton’s Program in Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies along with the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies hosted Ambassador Andrei Sannikov, a Belarusian politician, diplomat, and activist. He was a candidate in the 2010 race for president in Belarus, receiving the second largest share of the popular vote after Alexander Lukashenko. Following the election, he participated in peaceful protests against election fraud, which led to his subsequent arrest and incarceration as a prisoner of conscience. He was released and pardoned in 2012, but as a result of constant political threats from the Lukashenko regime, he was forced to flee the country. He continues to promote non-violent, pro-democracy reform efforts from abroad. 

Sannikov began his talk, which was titled “Freedom Fighting Under Oppression: The Experience of Non-Violent Struggle Under Dictatorship in Belarus,” with the statement that current events in Belarus have “an impact not only on the region, not only on Europe, but internationally.” He then highlighted two important dates that demonstrate the role of Belarus in international politics, beginning with March 13, 1898. On this date, the 1st Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party met in Minsk, playing a key role in the creation of the Communist Party in Russia. Then, on December 8, 1991, the Soviet Union was peacefully declared dissolved, giving rise to an independent Belarus.

At this point, Sannikov transitioned to a discussion of how Belarus evolved after the collapse of the Soviet Union. He noted that a period of liberalization began, which created a parliamentary republic in Belarus. Though there were setbacks, the development of democracy proceeded at a relatively strong pace until Lukashenko came to power in 1994 after a relatively democratic election. In December of that year, Lukashenko visited Tashkent, Uzbekistan. This, according to Sannikov, marks the beginning of post-Soviet dictatorship in Belarus because it was there that Lukashenko saw “the model he wanted to follow.” Then, Lukashenko used the 1995 referendum to change the national symbols of Belarus, most notably the flag, and declare Russian the second state language. This second action bolstered claims that Belarus was an “example of Russification” and strong Russian influence in the post-Soviet sphere. In response to these changes, there was a peaceful protest by parliamentarians, but they were forcefully kicked out by law enforcement authorities.

A year later, in November of 1996, the Kremlin sent a high-level delegation to help Lukashenko solidify his dictatorial power. Subsequently, he disbanded parliament and established his own. Sannikov remarked, “after this referendum, I think Lukashenko became a full-fledged dictator.” In 2004, he removed all term limits on his presidency, effectively ensuring his continued dictatorial regime. Most recently, during the 2022 referendum, he reintroduced the National Assembly, the purpose of which remains unclear but seems intended to support Lukashenko’s regime. Lukashenko also removed the constitutional clause that committed Belarus to a non-nuclear status, undoing the strides Sannikov made during the nuclear disarmament negotiations of the early 1990s.

For Sannikov, the opportunity for regime change does not lie in the parliamentary elections, where loyalists “just rubber stamp whatever Lukashenko and his administration decide.” Rather, Sannikov asserted that “presidential elections were something else. We could really organize a meaningful campaign against him and use some very limited but still legal opportunities to challenge him.” Despite this, Sannikov is sure that election fraud has been the key to Lukashenko’s repeated re-election. He contended that Lukashenko only won in 1994, and that the rest of the elections were fraudulent.

Here, Sannikov discussed the ways in which Lukashenko repressed non-violent activists who were helping the opposition movement. He cited the 1999 wave of government-orchestrated kidnappings and killings, naming Viktar Hanchar, Yury Zakharanka, and Anatol Krasouski. When figures such as these fought peacefully for change, Lukashenko responded with violence and force. According to Sannikov, in these instances, “we needed some kind of protection from the international community,” but world powers provided very little support. 

One of the main modes of foreign intervention was sanctions, but Sannikov criticized the ineffective implementation of them, arguing that they were lacking strength and breadth. Eventually, as he noted, Western powers became “tired of their own courage.” According to Sannikov, their discontinuation of sanctions, which he referred to as part of the “pendulum of politics,” their appeasement policy, and the absence of strong intervention against Lukashenko’s repressive dictatorship demonstrated a “short” and “weak” attention span. Then, Sannikov connected this to the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, arguing that these events would not have transpired if the West had, by intervening in Belarus, demonstrated a stronger commitment to promoting democracy.

To conclude his talk, Sannikov stressed that “Belarus is the linchpin to all the security problems in the region.” For him, it is evident that Belarus deserves more attention and more help “not only because of us, but because of security. If not for the Lukashenko regime in Belarus, there would be no war in Ukraine.” In essence, according to Sannikov, “Putin needed this springboard” to realize his plans of invasion.

At this point, he invited questions from the audience. The first question involved the distinction between the right to revolution and the right to peaceful demonstration. In the case of Belarus, where a repressive dictatorship presides, is there a need for a revolution as opposed to peaceful demonstration? Sannikov contended that peaceful demonstration “is the only channel of communication.” He also maintained that a revolution does not necessitate violence and can be based in peaceful protests, like those that occurred in Belarus in 2020. Furthermore, he expressed that he wants to keep the movement non-violent because “violence brings violence.” To do this, they must take advantage of “windows of opportunities.”

Next, an audience member asked when he foresees Belarus breaking its ties with Russia. His response was that the “criminal relationship” with Russia will end when the reform movement succeeds and when Belarus joins NATO and the European Union. Another attendee asked what sanctions on and assistance to Belarus should look like. Sannikov’s response was that Belarus has a “horrendous situation with political prisoners,” and that this must be a priority of the sanctions. To accomplish this, countries need to impose sectoral sanctions, expel Lukashenko’s ambassadors, and recall their own ambassadors.

Later, another audience member asked about the failure of the 2020 peaceful uprising, citing a common claim that it was due to a lack of willingness to take up arms. Sannikov, reiterating his opposition to violence, stated that “armed resistance was not an option” because, in addition to his previous reasons, they were not prepared for it and there was no cooperation from elites. Instead, the failure was largely due to the incarceration of prominent opposition leaders like Mikola Statkevich and Sergei Tikhanovsky.

One of the last questions was why Sannikov is so optimistic about a post-Lukashenko government. In fact, is it not likely that another dictatorial regime would just replace Lukashenko’s? Sannikov declared that he is optimistic about the future of Belarus, qualifying that there are many dangers but also many opportunities. He also mentioned that he has a network of international experts that are ready to help Belarus develop a strong democracy after Lukashenko is ousted. In essence, he said, “we are better prepared for changes than the regime of Lukashenko.”

Throughout Sannikov’s talk, he stressed the importance of supporting the non-violent, pro-freedom opposition movement in Belarus, a key nation in European politics. Although the current situation seems bleak to many, Sannikov expressed a strong optimism that “windows of opportunity” exist, through which a “prepared” opposition will reclaim their freedom in a post-Lukashenko nation.

By Nicholas Vickery